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This paper aims to bridge the relationship between metalinguistic 'if you like' as a non-8 
propositional discourse marker and its conditional counterparts. This paper claims that 9 
metalinguistic 'if you like' is polysemous between a hedge that denotes the speaker's reduced 10 
commitment to some aspect of the main clause, and an optional yet potential conditional 11 
reading that interlocutors can legitimately draw on in interaction which is brought about due 12 
to the 'if p, q' sentence form. That is, although the metalinguistic reading is most likely 13 
obtained automatically by default, it also carries an available conditional reading that is akin 14 
to other metalinguistic conditional clauses such as 'if you see what I mean'. Next, a semantic 15 
representation of metalinguistic 'if you like' is developed that takes on board a 16 
characterization of conditionality that departs from lexico-grammatical conventions, such that 17 
conditionals of the form 'if p, q' no longer bear a one-to-one correspondence with 'conditional' 18 
truth conditions. Employing a radical contextualist semantic framework in which the unit of 19 
truth-conditional analysis is not constrained to the sentence from, utterances employing 20 
metalinguistic 'if you like' are given a semantic representation such that the if-clause does not 21 
contribute propositional content, yet they also maintain their status as conditionals as the 22 
sentence form gives rise to a potential conditional secondary meaning.  23 
 24 
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1 Introduction 28 
 29 
Metalinguistic uses of 'if you like', as in (1), differ from 'standard' hypothetical conditional 30 
uses of 'if you like', as in (2).1  31 
 32 
(1) So I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. (ICE-GB S1A-064 142) 33 
(2) We can have a competition if you like later on. (ICE-GB S2A-049 052) 34 
 35 
The two uses differ as follows: in its hypothetical use, 'if you like' provides a condition on the 36 
truth or actualization of the proposition described in the consequent; in its metalinguistic use, 37 
'if you like' hedges some aspect of the main clause as a metalinguistic comment. 38 
Metalinguistic 'if you like' presents a puzzle for the semantics of conditionals insofar 39 
as it is typically viewed as a 'discourse marker' in linguistic analyses and, as such, does not 40 
contribute to the semantic (propositional) content of the utterance in which it occurs. As 41 
quoted in Heine (2013: 1206), 42 
                                                          
1 Examples in the paper are predominantly taken from the Great British component of the International Corpus 
of English (ICE-GB). These are referenced using the standard notation from the spoken portion of that corpus, 
namely of the form (S00-000 000). 
 43 
[...] the status of discourse markers remains uncertain (see, for example, Fischer 2006). 44 
There is little consensus on whether they are a syntactic or a pragmatic category, on 45 
which types of expressions the category includes, on the relationship of discourse 46 
markers to other posited categories such as connectives [...] (Lewis 2011: 419-420, my 47 
emphasis) 48 
 49 
This paper bridges the relationship between metalinguistic 'if you like' as a discourse marker 50 
and its conditional counterparts by addressing two questions. The first is whether 51 
metalinguistic uses of 'if you like' are, in fact, licensed in the category of 'conditionals' given 52 
that their primary function is to hedge some aspect of the main clause. I defend the view that 53 
while metalinguistic 'if you like' primarily functions as a non-propositional discourse marker, 54 
it gives rise to an optional yet potential conditional reading that interlocutors can legitimately 55 
draw on in interaction which is brought about due to the 'if p, q' sentence form. In other 56 
words, the meaning of 'if you like' is polysemous between its role as a hedge and its 57 
conditional meaning, and although the metalinguistic reading is most likely obtained 58 
automatically by default, it also carries an available conditional reading that is akin to other 59 
metalinguistic conditional clauses such as 'if you see what I mean'.  60 
The second question that follows is how to semantically represent metalinguistic 'if 61 
you like' such that a unified analysis of metalinguistic conditionals and their hypothetical 62 
counterparts is possible. The polysemy account defended here departs from both 'semantic' 63 
approaches that postulate distinct lexical semantics for different uses of metalinguistic 64 
phenomena, and 'pragmatic' accounts that treat non-propositional readings of otherwise 65 
propositional phenomena as secondary inferences. It is the latter approach that is typically 66 
pursued for conditional utterances of the form 'if p, q'. However, the challenge for including 67 
metalinguistic 'if you like' in the category of conditionals is that since its metalinguistic 68 
meaning is so well-entrenched, upholding the conditional reading as semantically prior to the 69 
metalinguistic reading is cognitively implausible.  70 
To overcome this problem, I depart from the view that conditionals of the form 'if p, 71 
q' bear a one-to-one correspondence with 'conditional' truth conditions. To get the desired 72 
truth-conditional results for 'if you like', viz of q simpliciter, I adopt the view from the radical 73 
contextualist theory of Default Semantics that the object of semantic, truth-conditional study 74 
is the primary intended meaning of the speaker (e.g. Jaszczolt 2010), where primary 75 
meanings are not necessarily informed by explicit linguistic content. Such a unit of semantic 76 
analysis draws on the conceptual structure of the primary intended speech act, rather than on 77 
the syntactic structure of the uttered sentence. By making this move, we can get the results 78 
that we want with respect to metalinguistic 'if you like': namely, utterances employing 'if you 79 
like' can retain their intuitive truth conditions where the if-clause does not contribute 80 
propositional content, yet they can also maintain their status as conditionals as the sentence 81 
form gives rise to a (potential) conditional secondary meaning. In other words, the 82 
metalinguistic meaning is arrived at directly, yet there is a potential conditional reading 83 
derived from the sentence form that can be drawn on by interlocutors. 84 
With this overview in place, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 85 
describes the uses of functions of 'if you like', relating it to conditionals of the standard type. 86 
Section 3 discusses options for semantically representing metalinguistic 'if you like', before 87 
motivating metalinguistic 'if you like' as polysemous in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the 88 
pragmatic criteria for conditionality (withdrawn references) that allow 'if you like' to take on 89 
a conditional reading as a secondary inference, and Section 6 shows how it is possible to 90 
represent both the primary and secondary meanings of 'if you like' in the framework of 91 
Default Semantics. Section 7 summarizes the research and points to future directions. 92 
 93 
2 Motivating 'if you like' as conditional 94 
 95 
Uses of 'if you like' can broadly be divided into two categories based on their functions in 96 
English discourse: 'if you like' can function as a conditional clause proper, as in (2), or it can 97 
function as a metalinguistic comment, as in (1), repeated below. 98 
 99 
(2) We can have a competition if you like later on.  100 
(1) So I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like.  101 
 102 
In (2), the truth or realization of q is dependent on the truth of p. This use contrasts with that 103 
in (1), where the use of 'if you like' puts some aspect of q into metalinguistic focus – in this 104 
case the phrase 'bone of complaint' – serving the function of commenting on the 105 
appropriateness or accuracy of the words uttered.  106 
Uses of 'if you like' of the metalinguistic type can be further differentiated according to 107 
what is being hedged. Three hedging roles of 'if you like' are identified here. The first is as in 108 
(1), where 'if you like' comments on specific linguistic aspects of q. In this role, 'if you like' 109 
typically occurs with metaphors or figures of speech, such as the phrase 'bone of complaint' in 110 
(1); it also occurs when the speaker searches for a particular word as in (3), when qualifying 111 
the use of words that may not be familiar to the hearer, such as in (4) – which draws attention 112 
to terminology specific to an academic field – or when the speaker is not themselves 113 
comfortable with a particular expression or to acknowledge that the hearer may not accept its 114 
use, as in (5) with the word 'forced'.2 115 
 116 
(3) The caricaturist […] presents a kind of unrelenting, uh, sort of repetition of a particular 117 
way of looking at them, um, a particular image of them if you like. (ICE-GB S2A-057 118 
072)  119 
(4) And that is the prosodic effect, if you like, of the liquids in these words. (ICE-GB S2A-120 
030 034)  121 
(5) More and more people are being, if you like, forced into the private sector. (ICE-GB 122 
S1B-039 102)  123 
 124 
In all of these cases, the metalinguistic aspect can be emphasized by putting the target 125 
expression in quotation marks to indicate that something non-propositional is being hedged. 126 
The second use of metalinguistic 'if you like' is where it hedges the overall 127 
illocutionary act of assertion, as in (6). 128 
 129 
(6) So if you like, that is the definitive statement for the time being. (ICE-GB S1B-007 130 
205) 131 
 132 
                                                          
2 See Brinton (2008: 164-166) for analogous uses of metalinguistic 'if you will'.  
While in (1) we can put 'bone of complaint' in quotation marks to make manifest the exact 133 
word or phrase being hedged, in (6) there is no specific phrase that 'if you like' attaches to. 134 
Instead, 'if you like' hedges the assertion of the entire main clause, thereby signalling the 135 
speaker's awareness of the impropriety or controversy of making the assertion expressed in q.  136 
The third use is that 'if you like' can hedge the propositional content of q. That is, 137 
rather than commenting on either the propriety of the words used or the speech act of 138 
assertion, it is the content of the assertion itself that is being hedged. Note that in (6), 'if you 139 
like' could plausibly function as both a hedge of the illocutionary act of asserting q, and of the 140 
propositional content of q, depending on the speaker's intended use. While this third use of 'if 141 
you like' does not concern linguistic characteristics such as form, pronunciation or choice of 142 
words, it can still be considered 'metalinguistic' on the basis that its primary function is to 143 
reduce the speaker's commitment to q as opposed to contributing propositional content.3  144 
Note that these three metalinguistic functions of 'if you like' can also be found in 145 
fully-fledged conditional sentence structures in which the if-clause makes those hedging roles 146 
explicit, exemplified in (7)-(9) respectively.  147 
 148 
(7) It is still peanuts if you'll pardon the expression. (ICE-GB S2B-021 017) 149 
(8) Very short skirt on if you don't mind me saying. (ICE-GB S1A-040 089) 150 
(9) He came to you seeking to expand, if you agree with me. (ICE-GB S1B-064 132) 151 
 152 
In (7), the if-clause comments on an aspect of the linguistic form of the consequent – the 153 
word 'peanuts' – thereby explicitly acknowledging that the choice of expression may not be 154 
accepted by the hearer. In (8), the if-clause acknowledges the potential impropriety of the 155 
speech act of asserting q. And finally, in (9), the if-clause hedges the propositional content of 156 
q, calling for the hearer's agreement on the content of the assertion.  157 
 These three uses of 'if you like', and by extension other metalinguistic if-clauses that 158 
overtly perform the same discursive function, appear to fall under Csipak's (2016) class of 159 
'discourse-structuring conditionals' which satisfy the two defining features that (i) p refers to 160 
a feature of the present discourse situation, as opposed to facts outside of the discourse 161 
situation, and (ii) p cannot occur with past temporal reference. The latter feature is shown in 162 
the comparison between (10)-(12): while the past tense for both the hypothetical (10) and 163 
biscuit (11) conditionals are acceptable, in (12) it is not (examples from Csipak 2016). 164 
 165 
(10) If Alex is in San Francisco right now, she is having iced coffee. 166 
(10a) If Alex was in San Francisco yesterday, she was having iced coffee. 167 
 168 
(11) If you are hungry right now, there are biscuits on the sideboard. 169 
(11a) If you were hungry yesterday, there were biscuits on the sideboard. 170 
 171 
(12) Alex is a little odd, if you know what I mean. 172 
(12a) # Alex was a little odd, if you knew what I meant yesterday. 173 
 174 
It appears that all three of the metalinguistic uses of 'if you like' considered here fall under 175 
Csipak's definition of a discourse-structuring conditional – including those that hedge the 176 
                                                          
3 Thank you to an anonymous referee for making me clarify this terminology. 
propositional content of q – insofar as p refers to some aspect of the present discourse 177 
situation, and likewise cannot occur with past temporal reference: 178 
 179 
(6) So if you like, that is the definitive statement for the time being.  180 
(6a) # That was the definitive statement, if you liked yesterday. 181 
 182 
(9) He came to you seeking to expand, if you agree with me. 183 
(9a) # He came to you seeking to expand, if you agreed with me yesterday. 184 
 185 
However, where my category of metalinguistic conditionals comes apart from Csipak's 186 
'discourse-structuring conditionals' is that she posits the additional defining feature that 187 
'discourse-structuring conditionals' are 'biscuit conditionals' such as (14), to the extent that q 188 
is considered true regardless of the truth of p, as opposed to hypothetical conditionals such as 189 
(13), in which the truth of q is dependent on the truth of p. 190 
 191 
(13) If John went shopping today, there are biscuits on the sideboard. 192 
(14) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. (Austin 1961) 193 
 194 
However, as I show below, metalinguistic conditionals do not always satisfy the criteria for 195 
biscuithood.  196 
Two standard tests (e.g. DeRose and Grandy 1999) to distinguish hypothetical 197 
conditionals from biscuit conditionals are the question (what if not-p?) and contraposition (if 198 
not-q then not-p) tests, exemplified for (13) and (14) below—where (14a) and (14b) are 199 
infelicitous. 200 
 201 
(13a) What if John didn't go shopping today? (There are no biscuits on the sideboard.) 202 
(13b) If there are no biscuits on the sideboard, John didn't go shopping today. 203 
 204 
(14a) # And what if I don't want any? (There are no biscuits on the sideboard.) 205 
(14b) # If there are no biscuits on the sideboard, you don't want any. 206 
 207 
On first glance, metalinguistic 'if you like' also appears to fail the tests for dependence 208 
between p and q. 209 
 210 
(1) So I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. 211 
(1a) # And what if I don't like? (I didn't go in with a bone of complaint.) 212 
(1b) # If I didn't go in with a bone of complaint, then you don't like (it). 213 
 214 
Such tests appear to license putting utterances using metalinguistic 'if you like' in the class of 215 
biscuit conditionals: p and q express independent propositions at the compositional level of 216 
the sentence. However, when 'if you like' hedges the propositional content of q, we get a 217 
different result. 218 
 219 
(6) So if you like, that is the definitive statement for the time being.  220 
(6b) And what if I don't like? (That is not the definitive statement.) 221 
(6c) If that is not the definitive statement, you don’t like (it). 222 
 223 
In this case, the truth of q is dependent on the truth of p, and 'if you like' acts as a conditional 224 
clause with a hypothetical relationship between p and q. So while metalinguistic conditionals 225 
share the features that p refers to some aspect of the discourse situation and that p cannot 226 
occur with past temporal reference, they are not uniquely a species of biscuit conditional as 227 
they can also take hypothetical readings. 228 
We could posit a difference between the uses of 'if you like' that hedge the form or 229 
style of q and those uses that hedge the content of q: in the former, if the antecedent is denied 230 
by the hearer (however unnatural it may be to do so), the speaker can only retract the 231 
acceptability of the assertion, not the assertion itself. By contrast, in the propositional 232 
hedging uses, any denial of the antecedent would require the speaker to deny the truth of the 233 
consequent as well. Such a distinction would correspond to Declerck and Reed's (2001) 234 
difference between 'metalinguistic P-conditionals', in which the if-clause comments "on the 235 
choice of words in [q] or on the pronunciation of a word" (2001: 353) and their 'content-236 
evaluating-P conditionals', in which the if-clause comments on the content of q (2001: 347).  237 
However, the motivation for such a distinction is refuted by the fact that it is possible 238 
for a metalinguistic if-clause to target both linguistic aspects of q and the propositional 239 
content of q, as in (7). 240 
 241 
(7) Chris managed to solve the problem, if "manage" is the right word. (Dancygier 1999: 242 
104) 243 
 244 
First, the tests for hypotheticality are able to target the relevant linguistic aspect of q, namely 245 
the conventional implicature associated with 'manage' that solving the problem was in some 246 
way difficult for Chris. This is exemplified in (7a)-(7b).  247 
 248 
(7a) What if "manage" is not the right word? (Chris did not "manage" to solve the 249 
problem.) 250 
(7b) If Chris didn't "manage" to solve the problem, "manage" is not the right word. 251 
 252 
This reading is made manifest by putting 'manage' in scare quotes—a case of metalinguistic 253 
negation. But equally, the tests can also target the entailed content of 'manage', namely that 254 
Chris solved the problem, as in (7c)-(7d).4 255 
 256 
(7c) What if "manage" is not the right word? (Chris did not solve the problem.) 257 
(7d) If Chris didn't solve the problem, "manage" is not the right word. 258 
 259 
In either case, (7) passes the test for hypotheticality, refuting the hypothesis that hedges of 260 
form/style versus propositional content correspond to the categories of biscuit and 261 
hypothetical conditionals respectively.5 In other words, given that metalinguistic 'if you like' 262 
                                                          
4 Dancygier's (1999) class of 'metatextual conditionals' also includes cases where the if-clause targets 
implicatures of q, such as in 'Chris managed to solve the problem, if solving it was at all difficult for him' (1999: 
104). Discussion of such examples goes beyond the scope of this paper, where the focus is on the metalinguistic 
discourse marker 'if you like' and its status as conditional, although the semantic analysis offered in Section 6 is 
expected to be able to handle such cases. 
5 Substituting 'if you like' for the full phrase 'if "manage" is the right word' yields the same results.  
can satisfy a dependency relation between p and q when 'if you like' targets the propositional 263 
content of q, or even a conventional implicature available in q, suggests that the question of 264 
what is being hedged in a metalinguistic conditional cross-cuts the hypothetical-biscuit 265 
distinction. In turn, this throws caution to the view that metalinguistic 'if you like' is 266 
semantically distinct from its conditional, hypothetical use, thus lending credence to the aim 267 
of giving a uniform semantics of metalinguistic conditionals and hypothetical conditionals of 268 
the standard type. 269 
 270 
3 Semantics versus pragmatic accounts of metalinguistic markers 271 
 272 
While metalinguistic 'if you like' shares characteristics with both 'regular' conditionals of the 273 
hypothetical type, as well as fully-fledged if-clauses that make explicit their metalinguistic 274 
use, there is an outstanding question of whether 'if you like' as a discourse marker belongs to 275 
the realm of grammar in the first place. Metalinguistic 'if you like' fits in the category of 276 
discourse markers insofar as it fulfills a non-propositional, metadiscursive function (cf. 277 
Hansen 1998).6 But just because a given word or structure does not typically contribute to the 278 
propositional content of the utterance in which it occurs, does not automatically write it off as 279 
potentially fulfilling a propositional role, and hence the question of what kind of semantic 280 
analysis they can, or should, be given remains open. 281 
 The semantics of a number of other metalinguistic markers has been given recent 282 
attention, including of metalinguistic comparatives (e.g. Giannakidou and Yoon 2010, 283 
Morzycki 2011), metalinguistic '…ish' (Bochnak and Csipak 2014), and metalinguistic 284 
intensifiers (Morzycki 2012, Beltrama 2016), exemplified in (15)-(17) respectively.7 285 
 286 
(15) Your problems are more financial than legal.  287 
(16) They won the match…ish.  288 
(17) Your shoes are downright huge.  289 
 290 
These varying but related phenomena mirror metalinguistic 'if you like' insofar as they all 291 
signal an attitude toward some linguistic expression. Moreover, accounts of these phenomena 292 
cited above each aim to relate the metalinguistic uses of the respective markers to their 293 
'ordinary' counterparts, showing how they share a common 'semantic core'. While the 294 
proposals differ in the details of their semantic treatments, what brings these accounts 295 
together is to treat the relevant metalinguistic marker as grammaticalized, and hence as a 296 
separate lexical item to their propositional counterparts. These accounts thereby favor what I 297 
term a semantic approach to the representation of meaning, in which different uses of the 298 
same word or structure give rise to independent readings which are determined pre-299 
semantically. One item is thus ascribed several senses in the lexicon—one per meaning 300 
variation. The benefit of the semantic approach is that different readings can be derived 301 
without assuming one as 'semantically prior' to another. The parallels between the readings 302 
can be captured in the different lexical semantics while at the same time differentiating the 303 
                                                          
6 As Heine (2013) points out, how to define a 'discourse marker' is not uniformly agreed; e.g. Siepmann (2005: 
52) classes metalinguistic comments as 'second-level discourse markers'. I opt out of this debate and retain 
'discourse marker' as a general term that indicates the non-propositional status of 'if you like'. 
7 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to these references. 
circumstances under which the metalinguistic reading occurs.8 This approach is best pursued 304 
when a metalinguistic phenomenon is considered grammatical, as opposed to pragmatic.  305 
It may be tempting to consider 'if you like' grammaticalized on a par with the other 306 
metalinguistic markers described above given both its distinct distributional properties and 307 
pragmatic function to hypothetical conditionals. This would not be a surprising move given 308 
the diachronic evidence for 'if you like' as a metalinguistic marker, with the conditional use of 309 
‘if you like’ dating from the mid-fifteenth century, and the non-conditional metalinguistic 310 
version coming in later at the end of the sixteenth century (Chen 1996). Indeed, Chen 311 
describes such if-clauses as 'deconditionalized', observing them as somehow resistant to 312 
formal reduction (Chen 1996). However, note the following passage from Fretheim et al 313 
(2003): 314 
 315 
Parenthetical expressions like 'if you like' [...] constrain the speaker's ostensively 316 
communicated propositional attitude [...]. Their extra-clausal syntactic position and 317 
the lack of stress that goes with that position are indicative of a grammaticalization 318 
process involving the loss of truth-conditional meaning. (Fretheim et al 2003: 59, my 319 
emphasis) 320 
 321 
Note that Fretheim et al refer to a process of grammaticalization; they do not state that 'if you 322 
like' is fully grammaticalized. In fact, as Hansen (1998) argues, discourse markers are 323 
necessarily not fully grammaticalized exactly because they are extra-clausal and do not make 324 
predictions about the syntax of their host units, and thus cannot constitute end points of the 325 
grammaticalization process. Hansen also reports a correlation between the 'semantic 326 
transparency' of discourse markers and their grammaticalization, to the extent that particle-327 
like markers (such as 'well' and 'anyway') are opaquer in meaning and are closer to 328 
grammaticalization, while multi-word constructions (such as 'in other words') tend to retain 329 
compositionality and productivity in a way that is closer to their propositional uses, and 330 
hence are further from grammaticalization. This latter observation aligns with those made so 331 
far for the multi-word construction 'if you like' to the extent that its different uses can be 332 
considered more or less 'conditional' depending on what is being hedged, indicating a 333 
retention of compositionality that mirrors the canonical conditional use. It is therefore too 334 
strong a move to consider 'if you like' as grammaticalized, and hence the move to treat 'if you 335 
like' as syntactically and semantically distinct from other conditionals should be avoided. 336 
An alternative, then, is to take a pragmatic approach to the problem, akin to Horn's 337 
(1989) seminal treatment of metalinguistic negation. On this kind of approach, a canonical, 338 
semantic, reading of a given phenomenon is assumed, while divergences from this reading 339 
                                                          
8 We could go so far as to describe these accounts as positing lexical ambiguity between the metalinguistic and 
ordinary readings. But note that describing the lexical items as 'ambiguous' does not presuppose complete 
conceptual distinctness between the senses in the same way as for ambiguous nouns such as BANK1 (financial 
institution) and BANK2 (riverside). In fact, the parallels between the metalinguistic and propositional versions 
are inevitable and expected given the diachronic relation between them; equally, because the metalinguistic 
markers are often in complementary distribution to their propositional counterparts – an indication of their 
grammaticalization – motivates postulating the different readings as due to their distinct lexical semantics. 
Rather, I use the term 'ambiguity' to refer to the level of representation at which the meaning variations occur. It 
is because meaning variations are accounted for at the semantic level that the same word/structure can be 
considered ambiguous, as multiple senses are not expected to co-occur in a given context of utterance. Thank 
you to an anonymous reviewer for making me clarify this point. 
are derived pragmatically. While Austin (1961) favored an ambiguity account to separate 340 
hypothetical from biscuit conditionals, the pragmatic account is generally preferred in the 341 
treatment of biscuit conditionals. The formal details differ between accounts, but the main 342 
idea is that the biscuit reading is derived as a pragmatic inference: since q is independent 343 
from p, the speaker must have independent contextual reasons for asserting the conditional. 344 
Franke (2009) is a strong proponent of this pragmatic view, which has been followed and 345 
refined by Francez (2015) and Lauer (2014), among others. A Franke-style pragmatic 346 
analysis is also followed by Csipak (2016) for her category of discourse-structuring 347 
conditionals that are closely related to the class of metalinguistic conditionals as discussed in 348 
the previous section.  349 
There are convincing arguments for this kind of unified position wherein different 350 
readings retain the same semantics, including the facts that both hypothetical and biscuit 351 
conditionals can be expressed using the same 'if p, q' sentence form, and that biscuit 352 
conditionals are well-attested across languages, indicating a systematic relationship between 353 
the two uses. Furthermore, given the prevalence of conditionals of the hypothetical type both 354 
in the literature on conditionals but also attested in language9, it is natural to posit non-355 
canonical readings as deriving from the hypothetical type. However, treating the 356 
metalinguistic reading as a secondary inference has undesirable consequences for a semantic 357 
account that strives for cognitive reality. This is because – following the tradition in 358 
philosophical semantics and pragmatics (e.g. Recanati 2010, Carston 2002) – semantic, truth-359 
conditional content is assumed to be derived by automatic cognitive processes that stem from 360 
the logical form of the utterance, while pragmatic 'implicatures' are derived through 361 
secondary pragmatic processes. Taking the hypothetical reading to inform the semantics of 'if 362 
you like' would therefore come with the theoretical commitment that interlocutors entertain 363 
the hypothetical conditional reading first, and then override the mismatch with the 364 
metalinguistic reading. In other words, it would make the metalinguistic reading of 'if you 365 
like' a secondary inference that is obtained via an explicit-to-implicit, two-stage cognitive 366 
process. So even when Gricean implicatures are considered the main, intended meaning of a 367 
speaker (cf. Jaszczolt 2010), the pragmatic account assumes them to be recovered by the 368 
hearer due to the mismatch in the assumed intended content and the explicit content of what 369 
is said.10  370 
What we want is to retain an element of both the semantic account – which would 371 
allow the metalinguistic reading primacy in the semantics of 'if you like' – and the pragmatic 372 
account, which would avoid 'multiplying senses beyond necessity' (Grice 1989: 47) and give 373 
a uniform semantics across uses. However, the struggle to do so seems to stem from the 374 
puzzle that 'if you like' presents in the determination of what counts as 'explicit meaning'. 375 
That is, while the conditional meaning is available due to the sentence form of the utterance 376 
in which it occurs and so appears the most likely candidate for explicit meaning, 'if you like' 377 
as a discourse marker makes the metalinguistic meaning no less explicit and certainly more 378 
automatic. What we seem to have is 'if you like' as a case of 'standardization', wherein  379 
 380 
                                                          
9 (Withdrawn reference) finds 76% of if-conditionals in the ICE-GB to be hypothetical conditionals of the 
resultative or inferential type. 
10 This is the case even when a speaker only 'makes as if to say p', as Grice (1989: 30-31) purported for verbal 
irony. In this case, the speaker does not, in essence, say anything; yet the ironic message is still computed as a 
conversational implicature. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out as a comparison case. 
the hearer can reason directly, thanks to standardization, from the utterance to the 381 
indirect force, but the direct statement (in indicative cases) is always recoverable. 382 
(Bach 1995: 682) 383 
 384 
In other words, the standardized metalinguistic meaning is the default, automatic meaning 385 
that a hearer is likely to recover, although the equally explicit, but conversationally 386 
dispreferred, hypothetical interpretation is nevertheless recoverable should the interlocutors 387 
choose to draw upon it. Indeed, the default interpretation of 'if you like' isn't even one that 388 
requires postulating 'unarticulated meanings' or a 'developed logical form' as on standard 389 
contextualist accounts (e.g. Recanati 2010, Carston 2002): the metalinguistic reading falls 390 
straight out of the use of 'if you like' as a discourse marker. The fact that we essentially have 391 
two options competing for the status of 'what is said', that is, the truth-conditional semantic 392 
meaning, both of which stem from the logical form, means that the dual-processing view of 393 
conditionals – and the explicit-implicit processing view of standard post-Gricean analyses – 394 
falls down.  395 
What I offer here instead is a third option: to treat 'if you like' as polysemous between 396 
its metalinguistic discourse marking function and its role as a conditional clause proper. This 397 
approach is motivated by the fact that one and the same utterance using 'if you like' can 398 
potentially give rise to both readings in the same context, warning against postulating 399 
separate lexical items for 'if'. Equally, it also avoids treating one reading as semantically prior 400 
to another: both readings are accessible, although given the salience of the metalinguistic 401 
reading, it is expected to be more consciously accessible.  402 
 403 
4 'If you like' as polysemous 404 
 405 
To treat 'if you like' as polysemous is to retain multiple senses of the if-clause as potentially 406 
present, allowing that more than one reading can be instantiated in a given context. This is 407 
different to treating the clause as structurally ambiguous with two distinct readings and then 408 
disambiguating the readings in context in virtue of the speaker's intended meaning. Rather, I 409 
use the term 'polysemous' to refer to the idea that both readings are accessible at the level of 410 
explicit meaning, and while one can be viewed as 'primary' (and hence 'semantic' – see 411 
Section 6) and the other as 'secondary', one can legitimately 'sentence-mean' both meanings in 412 
the same context.11, 12 To be sure, the first sense is the metalinguistic one: the reading that is 413 
expected to arise automatically by default, and that has led others to treat 'if you like' as a 414 
discourse marker without propositional import. The second sense is the conditional one, 415 
which requires greater justification as constituting part of the explicit meaning of 'if you like'.  416 
 From a discursive point of view, we have seen that 'if you like' shares a discourse 417 
function with other fully-fledged conditional structures such as 'if you don't mind me saying'. 418 
But a brief diachronic story will elucidate that the relationship runs deeper than simply a 419 
pragmatic similarity. Looking at the analogous clause 'if you will', Brinton (2008) conjectures 420 
that 'if you will' arose as a shortened version of the overtly conditional 'if you are willing to 421 
                                                          
11 The practice of keeping polysemous readings 'live' is what Nerlich and Clarke (2001) call 'ambiguating' in 
context—as opposed to 'disambiguating' in context.  
12 Note that availability of the metalinguistic reading is only applicable to metalinguistic conditionals in virtue of 
their pragmatic and distributional features described in Section 2 and is not expected to extend to all 
conditionals of the form 'if p, q'. Thank to you an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.  
do so' that occurs in directive contexts, where both if-clauses play the same discursive role of 422 
hedging the illocutionary force of the directive issued in q. Specifically, she suggests that 423 
these directive contexts included verbs of 'saying' and 'calling' as in (18) (quoted after the 424 
OED), thereby extending the role of 'if you will' beyond that of a hedge of directive speech 425 
acts, to that of a metalinguistic hedge.  426 
 427 
(18) Call them if you will, Popish fooles, and addleheads. (1641 'Smectymnuus', An 428 
Answer to a Booke entituled An Humble Remonstrance) 429 
 430 
Brinton suggests that such utterances using verbs related to 'calling' provided a 'bridging 431 
context' that facilitated 'if you will' to undergo a semantic shift from the directive hedge 'if 432 
you are willing to do so' to the metalinguistic hedge 'if you are willing to say so'. As she says, 433 
while the illocutionary force of such utterances would be directive and would thus lead to the 434 
interpretation 'if you are willing to do so', the verb 'call' "invites the inference that supplies 435 
the metalinguistic sense 'if you are willing to say so'" (Brinton 2008: 178). This 436 
metalinguistic reading then applied beyond verbs that explicitly invoked the acts of calling or 437 
saying, and hence the metalinguistic use of 'if you will' extended beyond directive contexts.  438 
Brinton’s analysis suggests that metalinguistic ‘if you will’ arose directly from its 439 
conditional use. An analogous development of metalinguistic ‘if you like’ stemming from its 440 
conditional counterparts can plausibly be conjectured by the fact that we can find 441 
metalinguistic if-clauses using 'like' that explicitly specify the metalinguistic sense, as in (19) 442 
and (20) (quoted after the OED).  443 
 444 
(19) "But why did he leave the half-million to his son, in his will?" "Gaga, my dear 445 
Binkie. Just gaga. Senile, if you'd like it better." (1929 W. J. Locke Ancestor Jorico 446 
xviii) 447 
(20) A steady blasting of the ship's whistle sounded abandon ship that afternoon shortly 448 
before six bells, if you like nautical parlance. (1966 H. Brean Traces of Merrilee viii. 449 
85) 450 
 451 
These examples increase the plausibility that 'if you like' is related to fully-fledged if-clauses 452 
such as 'if you like what I'm saying' or 'if you like to call it that' that use 'like' as a verb of 453 
appreciation, and hence that the metalinguistic conditional reading of 'if you like' can be 454 
obtained compositionally from an interaction of its derivative parts. To treat 'if you like' 455 
solely as a discourse marker does not provide any explanation for how intuitively close in 456 
both form and content 'if you like' is with the if-clauses in (19) and (20).13 457 
Acknowledging that metalinguistic 'if you like' retains a conditional meaning would 458 
allow for, and explain, the potential activation of dual readings when uttered in context. First, 459 
it is not only that bridging contexts with verbs of calling and saying support a diachronic 460 
relationship between 'if you will' and 'if you like' with their fully-fledged counterparts, but 461 
such contexts also highlight that the if-clauses can potentially take on both metalinguistic and 462 
hypothetical readings. 463 
 464 
(21) You could call it ingenuity if you like. (BNC, G4N 406) 465 
                                                          
13 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
 466 
In (21), both a metalinguistic and a hypothetical reading of ‘if you like’ is available: putting 467 
the target content in quotation marks – ‘ingenuity’ – makes salient the metalinguistic reading, 468 
while the verb 'to call' provides the directive force on which ‘if you like’ can operate as a 469 
hypothetical condition akin to 'if you like to call it that'.  470 
Note that it is not only in contexts of calling and saying that a dual reading is possible. 471 
It is the theoretical move to treat 'if you like' as polysemous and to posit the availability of a 472 
conditional reading that can explain how interlocutors are able to capitalize on the difference 473 
between its hypothetical and metalinguistic uses, as in the following extract from Michael 474 
Frayne's (2014) comic Matchbox Theatre: 475 
 476 
So what I'm proposing to attempt in this talk is, if you like, an investigation into why 477 
anyone who makes any kind of, if you like, comment on anything these days has to 478 
stress so many of the words as if they were in a foreign language, and then put 'if you 479 
like' in front of them. I suspect that it's intended to suggest some kind of... 480 
- Hold on a moment. If I like? (Frayne 2014: 201) 481 
 482 
While the comic value of the opening prose arises by the speaker using 'if you like' as a 483 
metalinguistic comment while also commenting on others' use of 'if you like' in ordinary 484 
discourse, the addressee's clarificatory question 'if I like?' draws on the hypothetical use of 'if 485 
you like', thereby highlighting the two possible readings. Admittedly, the fact that certain 486 
constructions can be used as the source of linguistic jokes cannot be taken as evidence for 487 
how speakers use constructions in everyday conversation, nor as a test for positing different 488 
levels of representation (cf. Jaszczolt 2016: 24). But the fact that a certain construction has 489 
the potential to be exploited for its linguistic properties can be taken as evidence of the tacit 490 
knowledge that speakers have in their linguistic arsenal (e.g. Aarons 2012).  491 
Finally, the availability of the conditional reading is perhaps more convincing when 492 
we see that a speaker can felicitously make reference to the audience's uptake, as in (22). 493 
 494 
(22) We all know the feeling of walking round thinking something's missing. Sometimes 495 
it's our trousers, that's rectifiable. But sometimes it is, if you will, the trousers of 496 
meaning. Well, <laugh> I accept some of you won't. (BBC Radio 4 2016)14 497 
 498 
Here, the speaker capitalizes on the use of 'if you will' to make it explicit that the target 499 
expression departs from certain conventions, and moreover, that a hearer may not accept its 500 
use. Although any elicited response is expected to be rhetorical at best, the 'if p, q' form 501 
nevertheless allows the hearer the potential to reject the phrase. That is, it is the form given 502 
by the if-clause that gives rise to a potential conditional reading that treating 'if you will' and 503 
'if you like' solely as discourse markers would not allow. 504 
To repeat, taking 'if you like' as polysemous is not to say that it requires 505 
disambiguating pre-semantically, but it is to retain both readings as 'live' options that can 506 
legitimately be drawn upon in interaction. To clarify, the two readings that are available are: 507 
(i) 'if you like' as a metalinguistic hedge, that indicates the speaker's reduced commitment to 508 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b07v0fv4 (accessed 14 September 2016). 
q in some way, and (ii) the metalinguistic conditional reading, which allows the hearer to 509 
draw on the use of 'if' to refute the legitimacy of the assertion of q. While the metalinguistic 510 
meaning is arguably the most likely, primary meaning of 'if you like', the conditional reading 511 
is an optional secondary meaning that may or may not be activated by interlocutors.  512 
 513 
5 The semantic 'core' of conditionals 514 
 515 
The upshot of viewing 'if you like' as polysemous with a potential conditional meaning 516 
invites the question of what the semantic 'core' of conditionals is that unites conditional 517 
metalinguistic 'if you like' with hypothetical and biscuit conditionals. This section draws on 518 
previous work (e.g. withdrawn references), outlining two pragmatic criteria for delimiting the 519 
class of conditional utterances that places the notion of conditionality at a conceptual level. 520 
Such a view on conditionals avoids an ambiguity account of conditionals, while also desisting 521 
the conditional-first pragmatic view. The case of 'if you like' also provides additional 522 
justification for seeking such a pragmatic construal of conditionals in order that the 523 
conditional meaning can be viewed as a secondary, optional, meaning that is derived 524 
pragmatically, rather than as an underlying semantic meaning that needs overriding to obtain 525 
the metalinguistic reading. But the benefit of adopting pragmatic criteria is not only that they 526 
will admit if-clauses that are used to express either conditional or non-conditional meanings 527 
as primary, but they have the added explanatory power of showing how expressions without 528 
'if', such as those in (23) to (25), express the intuitive conditionality that they do (cf. 529 
withdrawn references).  530 
 531 
(23) Take one more step and I'll shoot. 532 
(24) Your money or your life. 533 
(25) You like it? It's yours. 534 
 535 
Thus, not only do we move away from a semantic view of conditionals delineated by their 536 
truth conditions, but also from any definition that relies on specific lexical items or 537 
grammatical structures.  538 
To capture conditionality as a concept at the level of thought, I class an utterance as 539 
conditional as long as  540 
 541 
(a) the antecedent p indicates remoteness; and  542 
(b) p restricts the situations in which q holds. 543 
 544 
The criteria are 'pragmatic' insofar as satisfying them is not a matter of structural or 545 
propositional constraints, but requires recourse to pragmatic processing and extra-linguistic 546 
information. Note that these criteria do not override more familiar syntactic or semantic 547 
criteria, insofar as utterances adhering to form-based definitions will also be admitted in the 548 
pragmatic category. The difference is that the pragmatic category is broader in scope, as it 549 
admits conditional thoughts that are expressed without using 'if' which would typically be 550 
excluded from structural definitions.15  551 
 552 
5.1 Remoteness 553 
 554 
The first criterion of remoteness stems from Grice (1967), who proposed a pragmatic solution 555 
to the fact that speakers do not always treat natural language conditionals as material 556 
conditionals.16 He maintained that: 557 
 558 
[…] in standard cases to say 'if p then q' is to be conventionally committed to (to 559 
assert or imply in virtue of the meaning of 'if') both the proposition that p → q and the 560 
Indirectness Condition. (Grice 1967: 58) 561 
 562 
In other words, an utterance of 'if p, q' adheres to the truth conditions as defined by the truth 563 
function of material implication and, in addition, there is a Generalized Conversational 564 
Implicature that there are non-truth-functional grounds for making the assertion (the 565 
Indirectness Condition). To put it another way, an utterance of 'if p, q' is expected to be 566 
uttered in accordance with the Cooperative Principle, and thus if the speaker had evidence for 567 
a stronger statement, for example using 'since' in place of 'if', he/she should have said so.  568 
Without taking on the view that natural language conditionals behave as material 569 
conditionals, we can generalize Grice's proposal to the extent that use of the word 'if' signifies 570 
that the speaker does not present the antecedent as certainly true. Of course, not all 571 
conditionals are expressed using 'if', so to take the burden off any single lexical item, we can 572 
offer the more general statement that this uncertainty – what I call 'remoteness' – is a feature 573 
of the antecedent p in general.  574 
Conditional metalinguistic 'if you like', both following the 'if p, q' sentence form and 575 
using the canonical conditional marker 'if', satisfies the requirement of remoteness 576 
automatically in virtue of its form. That is, the conditional reading is obtained 577 
compositionally from its constituent parts, and so 'if you like' presupposes that the speaker 578 
does not expect the hearer to automatically accept q, and hence does not presume that p is 579 
true.  580 
It may be noted at this point that some antecedents, such as that in (26) appear to 581 
violate the remoteness requirement in virtue of being objectively true. 582 
 583 
(26) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which 584 
he does in fact show. (from Anderson 1951: 37) 585 
 586 
On this I maintain that, regardless of whether p is true in the actual world, by putting p in a 587 
conditional structure, it is presented as unknown and thereby suspends the speaker's own 588 
                                                          
15 The criteria are inclusive of syntactic or grammatical definitions of conditionals insofar as if, in the future, 
some if-clause were to become grammaticalized with no conditional import, those if-clauses would not satisfy 
the syntactic definition of conditionality in virtue of being separate grammatical markers. Thank you to an 
anonymous reviewer for making me clarify this point.  
16 There are ample studies showing that speakers do not process natural language conditionals as material 
conditionals (see e.g. Evans and Over 2004). 
assessment on the actual state of affairs. Even if the truth of p is made explicit, for example 589 
by adding 'and he has' after the antecedent in (26),17 it is by couching the true state of affairs 590 
in an if-clause that allows the speaker to construct a convincing argument: p is presented as 591 
remote precisely in order to argue that p is true. So regardless of whether the speaker is 592 
actually committed to the truth of p, by presenting it in a conditional utterance, the speaker 593 
signals that it is not, at least for the purpose of the utterance at hand, presupposed. In the case 594 
of 'if you like', remoteness is satisfied through the positive politeness strategy of not assuming 595 
the hearer will accept the assertion of q, regardless of whether the speaker believes that q will 596 
actually be accepted.  597 
 598 
5.2  Restriction 599 
 600 
Next, the possible worlds account of conditionals finds its roots in Stalnaker (1975), and it is 601 
from here that the second criterion of restriction stems. Motivated by the pitfalls of the 602 
material conditional as an analogue to natural language conditionals, Stalnaker proposed the 603 
following: 604 
 605 
[...] a conditional statement, if A, then B, is an assertion that the consequent is true, 606 
not necessarily in the world as it is, but in the world as it would be if the antecedent 607 
were true. (Stalnaker 1975: 68) 608 
 609 
Clearly, many conditional utterances do not lend themselves to a truth-conditional account of 610 
this sort, and these truth conditions will not adequately extend to biscuit conditionals where p 611 
does not restrict the truth of q. But what this truth-conditional theory provides us with is a 612 
way of thinking about conditional utterances that relies on restricting our attention to those 613 
situations where p obtains. This is the second criterion for inclusion in the class of conditional 614 
utterances: that the consideration of q is restricted to those situations that are specified by p.  615 
It should not be unsurprising then that, unlike Stalnaker's truth conditions for 616 
conditional assertions, this criterion need not be satisfied in terms of truth and falsity but may 617 
be satisfied in terms of p narrowing the field of discourse such that q is felicitously uttered. 618 
This more pragmatic notion of restriction gives rise to the familiar view of biscuit 619 
conditionals in which p clearly does not restrict the worlds in which q is true, but rather, 620 
indicates the situations where uttering q is relevant. In the case of metalinguistic conditionals, 621 
p specifies the condition on which uttering q is appropriate.  622 
'If you like' satisfies the criterion of restriction in different ways depending on what is 623 
being hedged. When 'if you like' hedges some aspect of the form of q, as in (1) repeated 624 
below, it satisfies the criterion in the same way as other metalinguistic if-clauses by providing 625 
a restriction on the situations where q is felicitously uttered—and specifically to those 626 
situations where the hearer accepts q.  627 
 628 
(1) So I went in with a bone of complaint, if you like. 629 
 630 
That is, 'if you like' restricts the acceptance of q to those situations where the hearer does, in 631 
fact, like (or accept) what is being uttered in q. 632 
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On the other hand, when 'if you like' hedges the propositional content of q as in (6), 'if 633 
you like' satisfies the restriction criterion in the same way as regular, hypothetical 634 
conditionals.  635 
 636 
(6) So if you like, that is the definitive statement for the time being. 637 
 638 
That is, the truth of q is restricted to exactly those situations where p obtains—again, namely 639 
where the hearer accepts the content of q. This comes directly from the content of the if-640 
clause, where 'if you like' targets the hearer's acceptance of q via the verb of desire. In this 641 
case, it is possible to refute the truth of q by refuting the truth of p (cf. (6b) and (6c) in 642 
Section 2). 643 
Locating conditionality at the level of thought is a move away from requiring an 644 
underlying conditional semantics of 'if you like', allowing the if-clause to retain its status as a 645 
discourse marker, while making available conditionality as a potential secondary meaning for 646 
interlocutors to draw upon. The final task is to show how we can semantically represent 647 
utterances using 'if you like' such that they retain conditionality as a potential meaning, 648 
without the consequence that the if-clause must contribute to the propositional content of the 649 
utterance. In the following section, I propose a solution that departs from the explicit-to-650 
implicit processing route of conditional utterances, in favor of one that prioritizes the 651 
automatic, default meaning for the status of 'what is said' – namely, the metalinguistic reading 652 
– and hence informing the truth-conditional content of the utterance.  653 
 654 
6 Representing metalinguistic conditionals in Default Semantics 655 
 656 
The option I pursue here as an alternative to the semantic and pragmatic approaches to 657 
metalinguistic markers described in Section 3 is that offered by the radical contextualist 658 
theory of Default Semantics (e.g. Jaszczolt 2010). There are many varieties of semantic 659 
contextualism, but generally speaking, they are guided by the overarching principles that 660 
truth conditions are not constrained by the sentence form, and that context is allowed to play 661 
a significant role in determining the truth-conditional unit. However, while on 'standard' 662 
contextualist analyses both 'bottom up' and 'top down' processes are allowed to operate on the 663 
words uttered to produce an enriched, 'developed' (e.g. Carston 2002) or 'modulated' (e.g. 664 
Recanati 2010) logical form, the downside to these proposals is that 'what is said' (truth-665 
conditional content) is mandated by the output of grammar and is logically prior to 'what is 666 
implicated'. The problem of taking this approach for 'if you like' stems from the question of 667 
what counts as its explicit meaning, and whether the metalinguistic reading or the 668 
hypothetical reading should take precedence as constituting the 'output of grammar'.  669 
In contrast to these approaches, in Default Semantics the logical form of the utterance 670 
is allowed to be overridden to align with the primary, intended meaning of that utterance. The 671 
upshot of this move is that truth conditions may be predicated of a unit which corresponds to 672 
the syntactic form of the uttered sentence to varying degrees. In the case of 'if you like', it is 673 
not that the logical form needs overriding per se, but simply that the if-clause should not 674 
contribute to truth-conditional content. But the benefit of potentially overriding the logical 675 
form as is admitted by Default Semantics is that the traditional two-tiered theory consisting of 676 
'what is said' (including developments of the logical form, modulated senses, or free 677 
pragmatic enrichment, depending on one's contextualist theory) and 'what is implicated' 678 
(meanings expressed that go beyond the scope of the syntactic form of the utterance) is 679 
collapsed to a one-tiered theory. The logical form of the sentence is not given any preferential 680 
status in the model of meaning but is treated as just one source of information that contributes 681 
towards generating the primary meaning, and hence unit of truth-conditional analysis. 682 
Note that on such a one-tiered theory, conditional sentences (of the form 'if p, q') with 683 
a non-conditional primary meaning, as in the case of 'if you like', will still retain a potential 684 
conditional meaning that is borne out of the sentence form. However, the explicit conditional 685 
meaning that pertains to the 'if p, q' sentence retains the status of a secondary meaning, 686 
roughly corresponding to an 'implicature' in Gricean pragmatics, which may or may not be 687 
activated by interlocutors in conversation. However, the difference between the post-Gricean 688 
contextualist accounts briefly mentioned above and the one-tiered version of Default 689 
Semantics, is that in the latter, the statuses of propositional content (primary meanings) and 690 
implicatures (secondary meanings) are no longer tied to a distinction between explicit, uttered 691 
content, and implicit, recovered content. Rather, the explicit/implicit distinction cuts across 692 
the primary/secondary distinction: the explicit content from a conditional sentence may take 693 
the role of a secondary meaning, while an implicitly recovered conditional meaning may 694 
constitute the primary meaning, and vice versa. And in the case of 'if you like', we don't even 695 
have to commit to there being one explicit meaning: the primary function of 'if you like' in a 696 
given context is likely to be as a discourse marker that hedges some aspect of q, while the 697 
form of 'if you like' also makes available a potential secondary meaning of conditionality that 698 
may or may not be activated in different contexts.  699 
Treating the metalinguistic reading as primary and the hypothetical reading as 700 
secondary is a controversial move that counters much of the extant philosophical and 701 
linguistic literature on conditionals. As such, it is worth expanding on its theoretical 702 
implications. First, it has to be emphasized that the account defended here prioritizes primary, 703 
intended meanings in the construction of semantic representations. This means that, in line 704 
with the more familiar view on the semantics of conditionals, for 'ordinary' conditionals of 705 
the hypothetical type for which the hypothetical meaning is the primary one, the hypothetical 706 
meaning will take precedence in the semantic truth-conditional representation. But this is in 707 
virtue of equating primary meanings with truth-conditionals meaning, and not because the 708 
explicit sentence meaning is solely responsible for deriving semantic content. As discussed 709 
by (withdrawn references), conditional sentences displaying a hypothetical relationship 710 
between p and q at the level of the logical form are not always used to communicate 711 
hypothetical conditional primary meanings, nor are all biscuit conditionals used to 712 
communicate non-conditional primary meanings. As such, a major benefit of taking primary 713 
meanings as the object of truth-conditional study is that we can offer a uniform semantic 714 
account of the conditional and non-conditional meanings that are expressed using the same 'if 715 
p, q' sentence form – as well as conditional meanings expressed using non-canonical forms, 716 
as hinted in Section 6 – that is faithful to the cognitive processing of meanings as they are 717 
automatically used and recovered in context irrespective of the sentence form by which they 718 
are carried. 719 
To finish, I briefly outline the key principles of Default Semantics (henceforth DS) 720 
that will be sufficient for demonstrating how we can represent the relevant meanings of 'if 721 
you like'. Note that DS is not the only framework available for such an analysis, and full 722 
explication of the details of the theory would take us beyond the scope of this paper. What I 723 
detail below is an illustration of how interlocutors are presumed to arrive at the potential 724 
primary and secondary meanings inferred from utterances using 'if you like', as DS offers 725 
conceptual representations pertaining to speakers' general cognitive mechanisms.18  726 
First, DS takes compositionality as a methodological assumption, but rather than 727 
applying it at the level of sentence meaning, uses it at a higher level of representation at 728 
which different sources of information contribute to the composition of meaning. DS 729 
identifies five different sources of information pertaining to both linguistic and extra-730 
linguistic information, namely: (i) word meaning and sentence structure, (ii) world 731 
knowledge, (iii) situation of discourse, (iv) stereotypes and presumptions about society and 732 
culture, and (v) properties of the human inferential system. Next, DS identifies four potential 733 
processes that can operate on the material taken from these sources of information: of 734 
relevance to us here are (i) word meaning and sentence structure (WS: note that this is both a 735 
source of information and a process), and (ii) social, cultural and world knowledge defaults 736 
(SCWD). Finally, these processes culminate in a merger of information (Σ for 'summation') 737 
that in turn outputs the primary meaning of a given utterance. It is important to note that for 738 
different utterances and in different contexts, the sources (and processes operating on them) 739 
will contribute to the merger of information in greater or lesser degrees. WS is the source that 740 
pertains to the logical form of the sentence, including word meanings and sentence structure, 741 
but, crucially, is regarded as just one of several sources of information and can be overridden 742 
by the output of other sources if the context requires it. So to summarize, both primary 743 
meanings and secondary meanings are modeled as the output resulting from the merger of 744 
information coming from the different sources of information. 745 
With this brief overview in place, we can now move to represent conditional 746 
utterances using these tools. For the standard cases of conditional sentences with a 747 
conditional primary meaning, the content of that primary meaning comes directly from the 748 
logical form of the sentence, that is, the source WS. Figure 1 represents the conditional 749 




The discourse referents are denoted by x, y, Σ' and Σ'', and the discourse conditions follow 754 
underneath in square brackets. The subscript after the square brackets refers to the type of 755 
process operating on the content inside the brackets. And as we can see from the 756 
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(withdrawn reference) on representing conditional utterances both with and without 'if'. 
representation, it is only WS that plays a role in generating the required meaning, and the 757 
'standard' conditional truth conditions can be applied to this unit of analysis.  758 
  Crucially, what the composition of processes allows us to do is to represent the non-759 
conditional meaning that is the primary, intended content of a conditional using 760 
metalinguistic 'if you like' such as (1), as in Figure 2. 761 
 762 
 763 
  764 
The primary meaning pertaining to q comes about due to an interaction of the logical form, 765 
the source WS, with the fact that speakers know how 'if you like' is intended to be 766 
understood; in other words, it is due to the hedging role of p that the hearer is able to recover 767 
that the main message pertains to q alone. This tacit knowledge is attributed as a default of 768 
the SCWD (social, cultural and world knowledge) type.  769 
Finally, the conditional secondary meaning can be represented as in Figure 3, 770 
highlighting that the speaker's assertion is only accepted when it is deemed felicitous by the 771 
addressee.  772 
 773 
 774 
  775 
Here, the logical form is again responsible for generating this secondary meaning, but we add 776 
in an extra processing step, namely the one in which q is only accepted into the discourse on 777 
the acceptance of the hearer. The conditional readings of other metalinguistic conditionals 778 
such as (8) (repeated below) would be represented analogously, where q is deemed to be 779 
conditional on the felicity of its utterance.  780 
 781 
(8) Very short skirt on if you don't mind me saying.  782 
 783 
However, other biscuit conditionals would differ in the details, depending on what exactly is 784 
conditional: whether that be the relevance of an assertion, a condition for an offer, and so 785 
forth. Giving the exact representations for such conditional meanings is a task for another 786 
day. 787 
To sum up, by taking on board a truth-conditional unit that pertains to a higher level 788 
of representation than that of the uttered sentence form, we are able to represent the main, 789 
intuitive content that is communicated via 'if you like'. Such representations are easily 790 
extendable to other utterances whose conditional meaning may be either primary or 791 
secondary. But in addition, we are also able to obtain the desired result that conditional 792 
meanings communicated by non-standard conditionals such as 'if you like' retain their 793 
conditionality as secondary meanings without the consequence that p has to contribute to the 794 
truth-conditional, semantic content of the utterance. This is because although conditionality is 795 
intrinsically linked to the sentence structure, it plays a dual role of a discourse marker that 796 
gives rise to the non-conditional truth-conditional unit. 797 
 798 
7 Concluding remarks 799 
 800 
This paper has analyzed utterances using metalinguistic 'if you like' in light of their apparent 801 
mismatch in conditionality and truth conditions, and in doing so I hope to have shown that 802 
the status of 'if you like' as a discourse marker and its conditionality need not be mutually 803 
exclusive. This has been achieved by first viewing 'if you like' as polysemous, with a 804 
dominant metalinguistic hedging reading, and an additional, optional, conditional meaning 805 
that can legitimately be activated by interlocutors in discourse. 'If you like' is thus co-opted in 806 
the conceptual category of conditionals at large that takes pragmatic criteria for its 807 
delineation. This category encompasses conditionality either expressed as the primary, 808 
intended meaning of the speaker, or as a secondary meaning that is derived via pragmatic 809 
processing. While this is admittedly still a two-step processing view of metalinguistic 810 
conditionals, it is a move away from the 'explicit-first' view. This is because the primary non-811 
conditional meaning of a hedge is obtained automatically by default, while the conditional 812 
meaning would only likely be recovered as a secondary 'implicature'. The upshot is that by 813 
taking the primary meaning as the truth-conditional unit, 'if you like' need not contribute to 814 
the truth conditions of the utterance in which it features, but it does contribute to 815 
conditionality. 816 
It is not a far step away to apply this analysis to other metalinguistic conditionals 817 
which perform the same pragmatic function in discourse. While if-clauses such as 'if I may 818 
say so', 'if you see what I mean', and so forth are less clear-cut as belonging to the class of 819 
discourse markers in the strict sense, they are nevertheless used to communicate the same 820 
metalinguistic meaning. In this sense, they also have the same duality of explicit meaning, 821 
where the metalinguistic hedge is the default, automatic reading, yet the more overtly 822 
conditional reading is still recoverable. Note that when we move away from the specific case 823 
of metalinguistic conditionals, there is the added consideration that both hypothetical and 824 
biscuit conditionals can be used to communicate speech acts other than straightforward 825 
assertion (hence the term 'speech-act conditional'), in which case the explicit meaning would 826 
require overriding altogether to obtain the desired primary meaning. This is only possible on 827 
an account that breaks away from the view that conditional meanings are equated with 828 
conditional truth conditions. What I have proposed instead is a reconceptualization of what it 829 
is to be conditional which is not tied to truth-conditional content, which allows us to target 830 




Aarons, Debra. 2012. Jokes and the linguistic mind. New York: Routledge. 835 
Anderson, Alan Ross. 1951. A note on subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. Analysis 836 
12(2). 35–38. 837 
Austin, John Langshaw. 1961. Ifs and cans. In J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), 838 
Philosophical papers, 153–180. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 839 
Bach, Kent. 1995. Standardization vs. conventionalization. Linguistics and Philosophy 18(6). 840 
677–686. 841 
Beltrama, Andrea. 2016. Exploring metalinguistic intensification: The case of extreme degree 842 
modifiers. In Christopher Hammerly & Brandon Prickett (eds.), Proceedings of the 843 
forty-sixth annual meeting of the North East Linguistic Society, 79–92. Amherst, MA: 844 
GLSA. 845 
Bocknak, Ryan & Eva Csipak. 2014. A new metalinguistic degree morpheme. In Todd 846 
Snider, Sarah D'Antonio & Mia Weigand (eds.), Proceedings of the 24th Semantics and 847 
Linguistic Theory conference (SALT), 432–452. LSA and CLC Publications. 848 
Brinton, Laurel J. 2008. The comment clause in English: Syntactic origins and pragmatic 849 
development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 850 
Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. 851 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 852 
Csipak, Eva. 2016. Discourse-structuring conditionals and past tense. In Proceedings of Sinn 853 
und Bedeutung 21. Preprint available online: 854 
https://sites.google.com/site/sinnundbedeutung21/proceedings-preprints 855 
Dancygier, Barbara. 1999. Conditionals and prediction. Cambridge: Cambridge University 856 
Press. 857 
Declerck, Renaat & Susan Reed. 2001. Conditionals: A comprehensive empirical analysis. 858 
Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 859 
DeRose, Keith & Richard E. Grandy. 1999. Conditional assertions and ‘biscuit’ conditionals. 860 
Noûs 33(3). 405–420. 861 
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. & David E. Over. 2004. If. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 862 
Fischer, Kerstin (ed.). 2006. Approaches to discourse particles. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group 863 
Publishing.  864 
Francez, Itamar. 2015. Chimerical conditionals. Semantics and Pragmatics 8. 1–35. 865 
Franke, Michael. 2009. Signal to act: Game theory in pragmatics. Ph.D. thesis, FGw: 866 
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC). 867 
Frayne, Michael. 2014. Twelfth night, or if you like, timon of athens. In Matchbox Theatre, 868 
200–204. Faber & Faber 869 
Fretheim, Thorstein, S. Boateng & I. Vaskó. 2003. Then – adverbial pro-form or inference 870 
particle? In Ken Turner & Kasia M. Jaszczolt (eds.), Meaning through language 871 
contrast, 51–74. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 872 
Giannakidou, Anastasia & Suwon Yoon. 2010. The subjective mode of comparison: 873 
Metalinguistic comparatives in Greek and Korean. Natural Language and Linguistic 874 
Theory 29(3). 621–655. 875 
Grice, Paul. 1967. Indicative conditionals. In Studies in the way of words, 1989, 58–85. 876 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 877 
Grice, Paul. 1989. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 878 
Hansen, Maj-Britt Mosegaard. 1998. The semantic status of discourse markers. Lingua 879 
104(1998). 235–260.  880 
Heine, Bernd. 2013. On discourse markers: Grammaticalization, pragmaticalization, or 881 
something else? Linguistics 51(6). 1205–1247. 882 
Horn, Laurence R. 1989. A natural history of negation. Chicago: University of Chicago 883 
Press. 884 
Lauer, Sven. 2014. Biscuits and provisos: Conveying unconditional information by 885 
conditional means. In Eva Csipak & Hedde Zeijstra (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und 886 
Bedeutung 19, 357–374. 887 
Lewis, Diana M. 2011. A discourse-constructional approach to the emergence of discourse 888 
markers in English. Linguistics 49(2). 415–443. 889 
Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 2010. Default Semantics. In Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog (eds.), The 890 
Oxford handbook of linguistic analysis, 193–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press 891 
Jaszczolt, Kasia M. 2016. Meaning in linguistic interaction: Semantics, metasemantics, 892 
philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 893 
Kamp, Hans & Uwe Reyle. 1993. From discourse to logic: Introduction to model theoretic 894 
semantics of natural language, formal logic and Discourse Representation Theory. 895 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 896 
Morzycki, Marcin. 2012. Adjectival extremeness: Degree modification and contextually 897 
restricted scales. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 30(2). 567-609. 898 
Morzycki, Marcin. 2011. Metalinguistic comparison in an alternative semantics for 899 
imprecision. Natural Language Semantics 19(1). 39–86. 900 
Nerlich, Brigitte. and Clarke, David D. 2001. Ambiguities we live by: Towards a pragmatics 901 
of polysemy. Journal of Pragmatics, 33(1).1-20. 902 
Recanati, François. 2010. Truth conditional pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 903 
Siepmann, Dirk. 2005. Discourse markers across languages. London, New York: Routledge. 904 
Stalnaker, Robert. 1975. Indicative conditionals. In Context and content, 1999, 63–77. 905 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 906 
 907 
